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usually provide that after a judgment has been rendered against a
motorist for damages arising out of an automobile accident, if such
judgment remains unsatisfied, he must provide proof of his financial
responsibility by securing insurance protection, depositing security with
the state, or providing a satisfactory bond; otherwise his motor vehicle
license is subject to revocation.
Under a "compulsory insurance law" such as that in effect in
Massachusetts, the jury could reasonably assume that an insurance com-
pany was interested in the action and therefore no prbjudice would arise
by reason of the questioning of prospective jurors upon their voir dire
as to their connection with or interest in a liability insurance company.
A group of eminent lawyers, the "Committee to Study Compensa-
tion for Automobile Accident," has suggested a plan of compensation for
injuries resulting from motor car accidents comparable to that of the
workmen's compensation laws. An outline by Arthur B. Ballentine,
chairman of the committee, appears in 18 Am. Bar Assoc. Jour. 221
(932). A symposium in 32 COL. L. REV. 785 (1932) presents the
arguments for and against this plan.
If such a step is not feasible it might be possible to combine in Ohio
the essential features of the Wisconsin statute permitting the joinder of
insurance companies as parties defendant, with those of the Massa-
chusetts "compulsory insurance law." This would obviate possible ob-
jections to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dowd-Feder
v. Truesdell, supra. More important, it would assure the financial
responsi'bility of those who own and operate motor vehicles.
JAMES R. TRITSCHLER.
TRUSTS
NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF A CESTUI QUE TRUST WITH PAR-
TICULAR REFERENCE TO TAXATION
Plaintiff, an Ohio resident, held seven transferable trust certificates,
representing undivided equitable interests in land, some parcels of which
were situated within and some without Ohio. The beneficiary was
entitled to a share of the rentals, while exclusive powers of management
were vested in the several trustees. The Ohio Intangible Tax Law,
Sections 5323, 5328-I, 5370, 5389, 5638, General Code, provided
for a tax, measured by five per cent of the income yield, on the invest-
ments of Ohio residents. The definition of investments included "equit-
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able interests" in land "divided into shares evidenced by transferable cer-
tificates." Plaintiff sought to enjoin the collection of the tax, as violative
of his rights under the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, as the land had already been
taxed to the trustees. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled the tax valid as
to all the certificates. Senior v. Braden, 128 Ohio St. 597, 193 N.E.
614 (1934). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, with three
justices dissenting, held the tax invalid as to all the certificates, on the
ground that the tax on those representing equitable interests in land
beyond the state violated the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and that the tax on those cer-
tificates, representing equitable interests in Ohio land violated Article 12,
Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, not being by "uniform rule accord-
ing to value." Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 55 S. Ct. 8o0, 79
L. Ed. 1520 (1935).
Tangible property, real or personal, is taxable only in the state
where it is situated. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky,
188 U.S. 385, 23 S. Ct. 463, 47 L. Ed. 513 (1902); Union Refrig-
erator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36, 5o L. Ed.
150, 4 Ann. Cas. 493 (1905). And recently it has been the tendency
of the Supreme Court to eliminate taxation of the same intangible
property interest by more than one state. It has generally held the
state of the owner's domicile to be the proper power for the taxation
of intangibles. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S.
204, 50 S. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371, 65 A.L.R. 1000 (1929); Baldwin
v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1O56, 72 A.L.R.
1000 (1930). Therefore, if the plaintiff's rights constituted an interest
in realty, it would seem to follow from these decisions that Ohio had
no power to tax the certificates representing equitable interests in land
in other states. On the other hand, if the plaintiff had an intangible
property interest, the certificates would seem to be properly taxable
by Ohio.
Two views have been set forth by legal authorities as to the nature
of the right of the cestui que trust in the trust res. Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees, V. 2, Sections 262-263 (1935). One view is that the cestui
has an in rem interest in the subject matter of the trust. Scott, Nature
of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 Col. L. Rev. 269 (1917) ;
Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U.S. 589, 35 S. Ct. 154, 59 L. Ed. 374
(1915); Narragansett Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Barker, 51 R.I. 37,
15o Ad. 756 (1930). Another line of authority views the cestui's
interest as a chose in action against the trustee. Stone, Nature of the
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Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 Col. L. Rev. 467 (1917); Abbott
& Goldman, Land Trust Certificates with Relation to Ohio Law, 2
Cinn. L. Rev. 255 (1928).
It was held by the United States Supreme Court in Maguire v.
Trefry, 253 U.S. 12, 40 S. Ct. 417, 64 L. Ed. 739 (1920), that the
income of a beneficiary from a trust consisting of intangibles located
in another state is taxable in the state of the domicile of the beneficiary.
But the Supreme Court has recently held that the state of the bene-
ficiary's domicile could not properly impose a tax upon the trust res, as
such, located in another state. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59, 74 L. Ed. i8o, 67 A.L.R. 386
(1929). (See City of St. Albans v. Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 114 Atl. 31
(931). There also the corpus of the trust consisted of intangibles.
That decision expressly left undecided the intermediate question as to
whether or not it is within the power of a state to tax the resident
beneficiary of a foreign trust, measured by his equitable interest. See
Brookev. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27, 48 S. Ct. 422, 72 L. Ed. 767 (1928).
The Maryland Supreme Court has recently taken the view that a
tax on the capitalized value of the income of a beneficiary from a foreign
trust of intangibles is equivalent to a tax on the corpus itself and is
therefore prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, 171 Atl. 37 (934)"
However, the opposite view was taken in Rowe v. Braden, 126 Ohio
St. 533, 186 N.E. 392 (1933), where the court sustained a tax,
measured by income yield, on the resident cestui's interest in a trust
of intangibles situated in another state. The court there relied chiefly
on Maguire v. Trefry, sutra. Which of these two views will be adopted
by the United States Supreme Court is doubtful, but in view of its
decision in the instant case and its opposition to multiple taxation, it is
probable that the view of the Maryland court will be accepted.
The above cases dealt with trusts of intangible property, while the
trust res in the instant case consisted of real estate. In holding that a
cestui's interest in a land trust was an ownership of land, the court
placed chief reliance on Brown v. Fletcher, supra, where it was decided
that a transfer by a beneficiary of his interest in a real estate trust was
not an assignment of a chose in action so as to preclude the assignee
from suing in the federal courts. However, that case is perhaps to be
distinguished from the present one, as there the cestui, by the terms of
the will, had a right to the corpus of the trust on arrival at a certain
age, while in the principal case, the plaintiff was to be at no time
entitled to receive anything other than a portion of the income from
the rental of the property.
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It was the opinion of the minority in the instant case that the
beneficiary's right was a chose in action against the trustee and not an
in rem interest in the trust res. This was also the view taken by the
Ohio Supreme Court. Senior v. Braden, supra. An analogy was drawn
to those cases sustaining a tax on the debt of a mortgagee secured by a
mortgage on land outside of the state. Kirland v. Hotckiss, ioo U.S.
491, 25 L. Ed. 558 (1879). Likewise an analogy was drawn to the
cases permitting a state to tax its residents' shares of stock in a foreign
corporation. Kidd v. .labama, 188 U.S. 730, 23 S. Ct. 401, 47 L. Ed.
669 (1903); Hawley v. Malden, 232 U.S. I, 34 S. Ct. 201, 58 L. Ed.
477, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 842 (1914).
It would seem that the plaintiff had nothing more than choses in
action in the' instant case, since he was only entitled to a share of the
rentals from the real estate, and could never get possession of the subject
matter of the trusts. Further, it is submitted that there is no essential
difference in principle between land trust certificates and shares of stock
or mortgage debts, taxes on both of which have been sustained, even
though the realty on which they were based was situated beyond the
borders of the state. The cestui's rights, evidenced by the transferable
trust certificates, receive the protection of the laws of the state of his
domicile, and as was stated by the minority opinion, a tax on such rights
would not be unduly oppressive.
Although not strictly an income tax, the tax in the instant case was
to be measured by a percentage of the income yield. This fact the court
did not discuss. Furthermore, it expressly disapproved of Maguire v.
Trefry, supra, where a beneficiary's income from a foreign trust of
intangibles was held taxable by the state of his domicile. Thus is made
doubtful the question as to whether or not a tax on the income of a
beneficiary from a foreign trust may be properly imposed by the state
of his domicile.
However, the majority opinion is in line with the Supreme Court's
tendency to eliminate so-called double taxation of the same property
interest. And in holding that the cestui's right extends to the realty, the
court is supported by the apparent weight of authority.
If the cestui's rights extend to the corpus of the trust, it logically
follows that the tax on those certificates which evidenced equitable
interests in lands within Ohio violated the uniformity clause of the
Ohio Constitution. ARcH R. Hicits, JR.
